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I. INTRODUCTION
Has an employee a right to a life away from work? The
answer our common law gives is a categorical "no." An employer
is free to condition employment on the employee's not doing all
manner of things off the employer's premises and on the
employee's own, non-work (and non-paid) time. This prerogative
is a legacy of the nineteenth century's translation of the law of
domestic service, of master-and-servant, into the industrial setting;
which idea of prerogative was carried over into the "at will"
employment rule adopted by the judiciary in the second half of the
nineteenth century.'
In an archetypical case, Payne v. Western & Atlantic Railroad
Company,2 the Tennessee Supreme Court confronted whether a
commercial tort was worked by a railroad superintendent's order
directing the railroad's workers not to shop at the plaintiff
merchant's store. The court addressed the order in these terms:
May I not refuse to trade with any one? May I not forbid
my family to trade with any one? May I not dismiss my
domestic servant for dealing, or even visiting, where I
forbid? And if my domestic, why not my farm-hand, or my
mechanic, or teamster? And, if one of them, then why not
all four? And, if all four, why not a hundred or a thousand
of them?
3
From this premise, the conclusion was inexorable:
[M]en must be left, without interference to buy and sell
where they please, and to discharge or retain employees at
will for good cause or for no cause, or even for bad cause
without thereby being guilty of an unlawful act ....
Copyright 2006, by LOUISIANA LAW REvIEw.
* Albert J. Harno Professor of Law, the University of Illinois. I wish to
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1. Philip Selznick, Law, Society, and Industrial Justice 136 (1969).
2. 81 Tenn. 507 (1884).
3. Id. at 518.
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The railroad workers made subject to the superintendent's
order were not to be thought of by the law as free men, to be "left
without interference to buy" where they pleased; they were thought
of as being in tutelage to their master, like children.
The exercise of the prerogative the at-will rule accords has
become hedged 'round by a crazy quilt of positive law, state and
federal. Almost half the states prohibit employers from interfering
with their employees' vote in elections, but only a handful assure
employees the right to engage in political activity. 5  Even as
associational life may be subject to an employer's dictate, an
employer may not interfere in one's right to join a labor
organization, a church,7 or to associate with the statutorily
disabled.8 More than half the states have legislated with regard to
an employee's consumption of lawful products: fifteen protect the
right to consume tobacco or alcohol and seven protect the right to
use any lawful product.9 New York has legislated to protect
engagement in recreational activity,10 and three states protect
engagement in any lawful activity; though these laws also allow
employers to regulate where an adequate nexus to the workplace
can be shown. A few states, carrying forward company store
prohibitions of the last century, allow for commercial freedom,
generally insulating the employee's choice of where to shop, rather
than what to buy."z But, absent positive law, the employer is free
to restrict private life as it will.
Last year, I placed these "lawful activity" laws in comparative
context, drawing primarily on the law in France and Germany.
13
These jurisdictions refuse to pay obeisance to the catchphrase of
"freedom of contract" when they know very well that the contract
5. These are cataloged in Matthew Finkin, Privacy in Employment Law
368-69 (2d ed. 2003) [hereinafter Finkin's Privacy]. New York should be
added to this group. N.Y. Lab. Law § 201-d(2)(a) (2006).
6. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2000).
7. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2005).
8. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(4) (2005).
9. Finkin's Privacy, supra note 5, at Pt. II. These are very largely the
product of successful lobbying by the tobacco and alcohol interests.
10. N.Y. Lab. Law § 201-d(2)(c) (2005).
11. Cal. Lab Code § 98.6 (2005); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-34-402.5 (2005);
N.D. Cent. Code § 14-02.4-18 (2005). The Colorado law was instigated by the
tobacco lobby but broadened in the legislative process. Jessica Jackson,
Colorado's Lifestyle Discrimination Statute: A Vast and Muddled Expansion of
Traditional Employment Law, 67 U. Colo. L. Rev. 143, 143 n.5 (1996).
California's law has been judicially eviscerated. See Matthew Finkin, Lawful
Activity Laws, Proceedings of the N.Y.U. 58th Annual Conference on Labor (in
press).
12. Some of these are set out in Finkin's Privacy, supra note 5, at 425-26.
13. Finkin, supra note 11.
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is one of adhesion in which the employee usually has rather little
or nothing to say. 14  Nor do they genuflect autoreflexively to
managerial prerogative, for it is the function of the law in these
jurisdictions to assure that the exercise of that prerogative stays
within socially acceptable limits. 15 Thus, the French Civil Code
guarantees each person a right to respect of his private life;16 and
the French Labor Code allows only those restrictions on liberty as
are P7ustified by the nature of the work and proportionate to that
end. The Cour de Cassation has read "private life" expansively,
to the point where, as some critics have argued, the distinction
between personal life (la vie personnelle) and the more intimate or
sensitive matters of private life (la vie privie) has judicially been
collapsed. 18  The Cour de Cassation, for example, has denied
enforceability of a contract clause requiring an employee to move
his domicile, that is to move his wife and family, in conjunction
with a transfer: the provision was not necessary for his presence at
the new location and it unduly disrupted his right to family life. 19
14. A French commentator lists the contract of employment (contrat du
travail) under contracts of adhesion (les contrats d'adhdsion) along with
contracts of insurance, for the supply of gas and electricity, and public transport.
Georges Ripert, La Rdgle Morale dans les Obligations Civiles 97 (4th ed. 1949).
See generally Aline Vallde, Le Consentement dans le Contrat de Travail (1930)
(placing that issue in comparative context).
15. Matthew Finkin, Menschenbild: The Conception of the Employee as a
Person in Western Law, 23 Comp. Lab. L. & Pol'y J. 577 (2001-2002).
16. C. Civ. art. 9 (Law No. 70-643, 17 July 1970): "Everyone has the right
to respect of his private life." ["Chacun a droit au respect de sa vie privie."].
17. Labor Code art. L.120-2 (Law No. 92-1446, 31 December 1992): "No
one may place restrictions on the rights of persons or on their individual or
collective liberties unless they are justified by the nature of the work and
proportionate to the goal sought." ["Nul ne peut apporter aux droits des
personnes et aux libert,6 individuelles et collectives de restrictions qui ne
seraient pas justifi es par la tdche a accomplir ni proportionnies au but
recherchg."].
18. See generally Jean Servatier, La Protection de la Vie Privie des
Salarigs, Droit Social 329-33 (April 1992). See also Jean-Maurice Verdier,
Interaction Entre Vie Personnelle et Vie Professionelle ai l'Intirieur et a
l'Extgrieur de l'Enterprise, Gazette de Paris 1419 (Nov./Dec. 1996); Olivier de
Tissot, Droits Fondamentaux du Salarid et Nicessitds de Son Emploi, Gazette de
Paris (Nov./Dec. 1996) 1423.
19. Cour de cassation, Chambre sociale [Cass. soc.], Arr~t no. 7, Jan. 12,
1999. The decision was taken to be noteworthy. Richard de la Tour, Raport
Anneul de la Cour de Cassation, 1999, Art. X (La Vie Personnelle du Salari,
Etude sure la Jurisprudence Ricente de la Chambre Sociale de la Cour de
Cassation). Professor Ray has argued to the soundness of the decision pointing
out that the court's treatment was identical to that accorded to contract
provisions forbidding airline stewardesses from being married. Jean-Emmanuel
Ray, Observations [sur] Contrat de travail. Libre choix du domicile. Clause
particulid. Conditions de licditi, Droit Social 288, 289 (Mars. 1999). There is
2006] 947
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Germany lacks a labor code, but the labor court system has
generated a body of decisional law that a popular legal treatise
summarizes in this way:
Off duty time must remain at the workers' disposition alone
. . . . They can choose their circle of friends, can marry
whomever they choose if and when they will, can go in for
sports, loaf, go for walks, pursue hobbies-whatever
appears meaningful to him or her.
2 0
The few American states insulating the employee's private
engagement in lawful activities seemed to me to embody an
analogous conception of the balance to be struck between
employer control and private life.
After those remarks were delivered, however, a broadside was
published not only against "lawful activity" laws, but against the
laws insulating the consumption of lawful products from employer
dictate as well.21 The attack is worthy of extended discussion in
the following sections, not because its arguments are legally or
philosophically novel or especially sophisticated, but for quite the
opposite reason: it is worthy of consideration because it perfectly
captures American managerial ideology, i.e., a set of beliefs that
simultaneously explain and justify the status quo.
H. THE CRITIQUE
The authors essay three grounds as arguably justifying these
laws: (1) a "pro-privacy" libertarian philosophy that "employers
have no business intruding into the 'personal lives' of employees";
(2) a desire to limit employment decisions to a "business-related or
performance-related justification"; and (3) a "desire to separate the
work and off-work zones and draw a bright line between them."
Fair enough. But however "compelling" these "philosophical
reasons" may be, the authors argue that, for three reasons, these
no doubt that such a provision would be enforceable in the United States.
Ortman v. Gordon Food Serv., 570 N.W.2d 152 (Mich. App. 1997).
20. 2 Wolfgang Daubler, Das Arbeitsrecht § 5.7 at p. 339-40 (1998). ("Die
arbeitsfreie Zeit muB allein der Disposition der Beschaftigten uiberlassen bleiben
. . . Der einzelne kann daher seinen Bekanntenkreis frei aussuchen und kann
heiraten, wenn und wann er will. Er darf Sport treiben, spazierengehen,
faulenzen oder auch Hobbies pflegen-ganz wie es ihm innvoll erscheint.")
(citations omitted).
21. Robert Howie & Laurence Shapero, Lifestyle Discrimination Statutes:
A Dangerous Erosion of At-Will Employment, a Passing Fad, or Both?, 31 Emp.
Rel. L.J. 21 (2005).
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laws are nevertheless a "bad idea." First, they further "no
particular public policy interest." Second, they substitute the
courts for the employer in the making of decisions that the
employer, not the courts, is best suited to make, i.e., that the
"particular off-work activity is related to [or sufficiently related to]
the employee's work or the employer's business objective" to
justify the constraint. To nail this argument down they set out
fourteen hypothetical cases where an employer would be justified
in imposing a constraint but where the authors fear a contrary
judicial decision. In fact, they argue that an employer should be
able to act in these cases preemptively, i.e., in the absence of any
manifest harm to the business. 22  Third, these laws work an
"unnecessary" erosion of and intrusion into the at-will rule, which
qualification recapitulates their arguments: legislation is
unnecessary because no public interest is served; because the
employer can be trusted to strike a sound balance between business
need and employee autonomy; and because of the sacrosanct
quality of the at-will rule. This last boils down to a tautology: an
erosion of management's right to discharge at will erodes
management's right to discharge at will. It need not detain us. Let
us then take up the other two.
11I. THE CRITIQUE UNPACKED
A. The Want of Public Interest
Contrary to laws prohibiting discrimination on invidious
grounds-first, race and sex, later age, and more recently
disability-in which the authors concede the public interest, the
argument here is that the public has no interest in the orders an
employer gives to its employees so long as the employer is not
commanding them to do an unlawful act. The argument, deeply
rooted in laissez-faire,2 3 prompts the necessary follow-on: how
22. Id. at 34.
23. In the last quarter of the nineteenth century, about 17% of the labor
market were employees classified as in domestic service. Historical Statistics of
the United States, Colonial Times to 1970, Dll-75 at 127, D167-181 at 139
(1975). Domestic servants complained bitterly of working conditions:
excessive hours, the loss of dignity, and the monitoring of private life. They
sought to unionize. David Montgomery, The Fall of the House of Labor 147-48
(1987). They sought protective legislation. David Sutherland, Americans and
their Servants 178-80 (1981). But, as the leading reformer of the period, Lucy
Salmon of Vassar College, observed in her "landmark monograph"
(Sutherland's characterization, id. at 166):
He [the employer] considers that neither his neighbor nor the general
public has anymore concern in the business relations existing between
2006] 949
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should the legislature be guided in deciding whether the public
interest justifies a constraint on freedom of contract? Given the
historical taproot of the authors' argument, the answer might be
found in the way the courts thought about the problem during the
period when the at-will rule was created, when deference to private
ordering was at its height.
In 1899, the Tennessee Supreme Court confronted the state's
truck law, applied in that case to forbid a coal mine from paying its
workers in bushels of coal.24 The system of payment may or may
not have worked a reduction in the cash value of the promised
wage; that would depend on market conditions and the astuteness
of the employee in anticipating them. In the event of a persistent
depression in the market price, i.e., of the real wage, the employee
was at liberty to renegotiate the terms or to seek employment
elsewhere. Was any public interest served in the legislature's
intrusion into the way the parties agreed wages would be paid?
The court observed that: as the power of the state
encompassed the enactment of such laws "as may rightly be
deemed necessary or expedient for the safety, health, morals,
comfort, and welfare of its people," the power to define the public
interest "must be expected and allowed to expand, and take in new
subjects from time to time, as trade and business advance, and new
conditions arise." 25 In this, the Tennessee court echoed the U.S.
Supreme Court the year previous: the law must adapt "to new
conditions of society, and, particularly, to the new relations
between employers and employees, as they arise."26 What of the
fact that the employer's wage payment policy was agreed upon, at
least in form? "[T]he fact that both parties are of full age, and
competent to contract, does not necessarily deprive the state of the
power to interfere where the parties do not stand upon an
equality. 27 Herein lies the public interest: to place the employee
himself and his domestic employees than it has in the price he pays for
a dinner service or in the color and cut of his coat.
Lucy Salmon, Domestic Service 122 (2d ed. 1911).
24. Harbeson v. Knoxville Iron Co., 53 S.W. 955 (Tenn. 1899) affid
Knoxville Iron Co. v. Harbeson, 183 U.S. 13, 22 S. Ct. 1 (1901). See generally
G. Paterson, Wage-Payment Legislation in this United States, BLS Bull. No.
229 (1918).
25. Knoxville Iron Co., 53 S.W. at 960.
26. Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 387, 18 S. Ct. 383, 390 (1898). Note
that it took a century after the Thirteenth Amendment for the body politic to find
the public interest to be implicated in private acts of employment discrimination,
which public interest our authors do not now question.
27. Knoxville Iron Co., 53 S.W. at 961 (citing Holden, 169 U.S. at 390, 18
S. Ct. at 397).
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and the employer "more nearly upon an equality. This alone
commends the act and entitles it to a place on the statute books ....
If this is so of wages, would it not be so of commercial liberty
as well? Sixteen years later, the Supreme Court of Tennessee
repudiated the holding in Payne v. Western & Atlantic Railroad
Company to allow that a commercial tort could stand on the facts
that had been asserted in that case 29 and, in so doing, it endorsed
this statement from the dissent in Payne: "It is argued that a man
ought to have the right to say where his employees shall trade. I
do not recognize any such right. A father may well control his
family in this, but an employer ought to have no such right
conceded to him."' 30  There is more: the freedom allowed
employers by the Payne majority, said the dissent, permitting them
"to require employees to trade where they [the employers]
demand," will allow them as well to require employees
do anything not strictly criminal that employer may dictate,
or feel the wrath of employer by dismissal from service....
Capital may thus not only find its own legitimate
employment, but may control the employment of others to
an extent that in time may sap the foundations of our free
institutions. Perfect freedom in all legitimate uses is due to
capital, and should be zealously enforced but public policy
and all the best interests of society demands it shall be
restrained within legitimate boundaries, and any channel
by which it may escape or overleap these boundaries,
should be carefully but judiciously guarded.
In sum, the public interest in these "lawful activity" and
"lawful product" laws is evidenced in the critics' very synopsis of
what they call the philosophy underpinning them: to assure a
better equality between employer and employee by giving content
to what it means to society for persons to be free of control over
their private lives; to give effect to the value people attach to
engagement in non-work activities meaningful to them, even if
only in the purchase of a consumable good; and, consequently, to
cabin worklife from non-work---or private-life. These are taken
up below.
28. Id. at 960.
29. Hutton v. Watters, 132 Tenn. 527 (Tenn. 1915).
30. Id. at 543 (citing Payne v. W. & At. R.R. Co., 81 Tenn. 507, 542
(Freeman, J., dissenting)).




1. The Personal Meaning of Leisure
Philosophers (starting with the ancient Greeks), historians,
sociologists, psychologists, and students of industrial relations
have long explored the meaning of the conjoined concepts of work
and leisure, even if the content of the latter is sometimes
contested.32  As the sociologist Erwin Smigel pointed out,
"recreation, amusement, fun, pleasure, play, hobby, idleness, free
time and leisure are employed interchangeably" in common
parlance.33 To the political scientist and philosopher Sebastian de
Grazia, leisure is distinct from mere free time, and even more
distinct from the pursuits Smigel catalogues. De Grazia would
return to leisure as a specifically Greek ideal.34  To others, the
focus is less classical if no less categorical. "The defining feature
of leisure," writes Joanne Ciulla, "is that it is intrinsically
rewarding: we do something for the sake of doing it and because
we like it. For those who have meaningful work, there is little
difference between work and leisure." 35 For those who find little
or no meaning in work, for whom work is merely a means of
physical sustenance non-work activities may become the central
focus of their lives. 3t But in either case:
32. The literature is substantial. Some of the more salient of modem
theoretical writing is usefully surveyed, if from the perspective of a question not
much pursued today-whether the devaluation of work wrought by
mechanization and the extreme division of labor incapacitates the regenerative
role of leisure, especially when it, too, becomes as rationalized (or debased) as
work-by Ben Seligman, Of Work, Alienation, and Leisure, 24 Am. J. Econ. &
Soc. 337 (1965). The historical interplay between work and leisure in
industrializing America is limned by Daniel Rodgers, The Work Ethic in
Industrial America 1850-1920 (1974). This is picked up in the debate during
the Great Depression by Benjamin Hunnicutt, Work Without End: Abandoning
Shorter Hours for the Right to Work (1988).
33. Erwin 0. Smigel, Introduction, in Work and Leisure 9, 10 (Erwin 0.
Smigel ed., 1963).
34. Sebastian de Grazia, Of Time, Work, and Leisure (1962). Note for
example, de Grazia's criticism of J.S. Mill's defense of "free time":
How will your free time be free if you have to be ready to go back to
work on the dot, and if your free time is clocked too, and if in it you are
reacting to your work-blowing off steam, making a whole article in
your basement workshop, wearily watching TV. Work is still working
on you. Your free time is two things: what your work permits and
what your reaction to work dictates. The first is a licensed time; the
second may be a licentious time; the third is leisure, conspicuous by its
absence.
Id. at 272-73.
35. Joanne Ciulla, The Working Life 205 (2000).
36. Rogene Buchholz, The Work Ethic Reconsidered, 31 Indus. & Lab. Rel.
Rev. 452 (1975). See, e.g., Robert Dubin, Central Life Interests (1992).
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Leisure is free, self-determined, reflective, and gratifying.
It is what you really want to do, when you want to do it....
It is a time in which we do those things that are valuable to
us and worth doing. Because leisure is a time when we are
free, it is also a time when we are most ourselves. Without
leisure we might lose track of who we are. Without leisure
we may find it more difficult to make sense of our lives.
37
It may be that the potentially regenerative role of leisure-
intellectually and spiritually-is debased by consumerism or
squandered in what to some are meaningless (or, worse, work-like)
pursuits.38  To moralists of that persuasion, "free time" is a
necessary but not sufficient condition for authentic leisure. 39 Even
were the point conceded, it does not follow that that time should
therefore be unfree, i.e., subject to another's dictate, because that
other-an employer or the state-finds the moral, regenerative, or
other quality of the free time activity to be wanting. The need for
play, more often expressed in leisure activities than in work
(though for a fortunate few work is play, or playful), is inherent in
human nature:" 0 the greater the constraint on it the less human we
become.
37. Joanna Ciulla, supra note 35, at 206.
38. The case of organized sport is vexing from the viewpoint of whether or
not it is spiritually or intellectually regenerative. It has been argued that
participation in a game creates a condition of equality not encountered in the
subordinating environment of work. Seligman, supra note 32, at 355-56. But
Adriano Tilgher has argued that, "[m]odern sport is less and less left to the
decisions and initiative of the individual, is constantly brought under the orders
of rigorous rationalization just like modem work." Adriano Tilgher, Homo
Faber: Work Through the Ages 186 (1930).
39. The moral as well as economic arguments over American workers'
leisure is discussed in Rodgers, supra note 32, and Benjamin Hunnicutt's Work
Without End, supra note 32.
40. John Huizinga, Homo Ludens: A Study of the Play Element in Human
Culture (1950). Richard Donkin, Blood Sweat and Tears: The Evolution of
Work 327 (2001) ("Work and leisure are vital ingredients in the soup of life.
They can run together as a fulfilling experience."). Note that a leading "how to"
book treats why amateur poker players play, the vast majority as a "leisure
activity" with a circle of friends. It is:
[A] form of male bonding, as a night out, as a release of aggressions
through the legitimatized use of hostile and self-serving behavior that
may be frowned upon in everyday pursuits, and as a controlled form of
gambling in which skill plays a part while luck remains to explain or
rationalize less than complete success .... All poker players are
created equal, even if all do not prove equally skilled.
Peter 0. Steiner, Thursday-Night Poker: How to Understand, Enjoy-and Win
6 (1996). This, from one of the nation's most distinguished economists.
20061 953
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
2. Communal Consequences, or, Leisure's Externalities
The Australian scholar, Ronald McCallum, put employer
controls over private life this way:
In a democratic society, working women and men require
what I call "home space" to nurture their relationships and
to parent their children; to engage in hobbies, recreational
and sporting activities; for spiritual contemplation and
reflection; to join clubs, churches, political parties,
community bodies and environmental organisations and so
on. Without time for these activities, community life loses
that wholesomeness which is the birthright of our future
generations.
4 1
Note that some of what he catalogues-participation in
political, community, and advocacy groups-has obvious social
significance. However, even when sodalities lack an overt
political purpose, e.g., recreational and sporting clubs, participation
in them builds up social capital in a way that has a broader ripple
effect; that effect contributes to more vital communities. 4 2
These effects are less obvious when leisure time is taken for
meditation, spiritual reflection, or merely loafing; when spent in
pursuits such as coin collecting, reading tarot, or consuming lawful
products. But societal benefits there are in such activities, not
necessarily in being composed of persons who lead more fulfilled
lives,43 though such may well be the case, but simply in being
composed of persons who are and who understand themselves to
be free: "[F]reedom implies an ability to function within the
standards established by human needs, and this in turn implies a
41. Ron McCallum, Employer Controls Over Private Life 6-7 (2000).
42. Cf Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of
American Community (2000).
43. Some leisure activities--compulsive consumption stands out-as with
other addictions, may be self-defeating as a source of deep fulfillment. But that
would be for the person to decide. Thus, a lawful activity law would prohibit an
employer from regulating its employees' lawful addictive behavior absent
demonstrable workplace consequences. Interestingly, one addictive behavior
that has negative personal and social consequences and that employers can
regulate because of its work-relatedness is workaholism. See Daniel
Hamermesh & Joel Slemrod, The Economics of Workaholism: We Should Not
Have Worked On This Paper, NBER Working Paper No. 11566 (August, 2005).
But, except for employees subject to the Fair Labor Standard Act's requirement
of overtime pay, it does not appear that American employers are inclined to limit
that activity.
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capacity to choose alternatives." 44 To the extent one is denied that
capacity, he or she becomes either dehumanized or infantilized.
3. The Separation of "Work" and "Off-Work" Zones
The authors treat this end as posing an insuperable obstacle for
legislative distinction; indeed, they suggest that the conflation of
the two, increasingly worked by modern technology, may explain
why so few states have enacted lawful off-duty activity laws:
PDAs and laptops and high-speed data connections
between work and home have blurred the on-duty/off-duty
distinction for many employees. For better or worse, more
and more of us find ourselves working anywhere and
anytime, even as we are engaged in other lawful activities
or the consumption or use of various lawful products.45
The argument is a non sequitur. It does not follow that because
an employer may insist on being able to reach an employee
anytime, anywhere, because doing work at home has or may
become commonplace, 46 the employer may therefore dictate what
soft-drink the employee may consume when at home or what
games she may play when away from it.
There is more historically to be said. Prior to the rise of wage
labor in the eighteenth century as the dominant form for the
manufacture of goods and the provision of services, the makers of
goods and the providers of services were either independent
contractors or journeymen, subject in both instances to extensive
legal and social controls, or persons in some form of tutelage, i.e.,
in master-and-servant (or apprentice) relationships. Capitalism,
the factory system, arose in tandem with the value the
Enlightenment placed on individual freedom: the employee's
freedom of contract was understood, in theory, to uncouple the
worker from moral tutelage. As Robert Castel explains:
The development of the modern system of wage labor
requires several specific conditions to come together: these
include but are not limited to the possibility of
encompassing the whole of the active population; a
rigorous delineation of the different kinds of work and the
clarification of ambiguous categories such as domestic
44. Seligman, supra note 32, at 341.
45. Howie & Shapero, supra note 21, at 35.
46. According to a 2004 Bureau of Labor Statistics study, 20.7 million
workers, over 15% of those employed, worked at home one or more times a
week. DLR No. 184 (Sept. 23, 2005) at D-4.
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work or agricultural work; a firm distinction between work
and leisure time; and a precise account of the times of
work.
4 7
A modem organizational theorist makes much of the same
point from that perspective:
[Tihe psychological and sociological life of industrial
culture was based on two developments and their
compensations: a more varied economic life balanced by a
simplified system of evaluation and a freer individual life
balanced by the more internalized voice of authority.48
In the United States, however, "the law imported into the
employment contract a set of implied terms reserving full authority
of direction and control to the employer" that had been developed
by the courts in the master-servant relationship.49
The natural and inevitable authority of the master could
then be invoked, for that authority had already been
established as the defining characteristic of the master-
servant relation. In this way, the continuing master-servant
imagery lent a legal foundation to managerial prerogative. 50
It is important to stress, therefore, that there was, and is,
nothing "inherently natural" or "inevitable" in that authority.
Under the master-servant regime it was for the courts to decide
what powers a master had: public law defined the scope of
managerial prerogative. 51  There is no reason to consider that
question settled as a matter of public law two centuries on.
In the Gilded Age, American employers did impose regimes of
moral tutelage on their employees by the adoption of rules
regulating off-duty behavior: because of a perceived connectedness
to work-dancing, drinking, going out late at night, and even
participating in religious revivals were forbidden as conducing
toward fatigue on the job the morning after-because of the
47. Robert Castel, From Manual Workers to Wage Laborers:
Transformation of the Social Question 87 (Richard Boyd, trans., 2003)
(emphasis added). See also Tilgher, supra note 38, at 160 ("The development of
capitalism tends... sharply to divide factory life from home life.").
48. Larry Hirschhorn, The Workplace Within: Psychodynamics of
Organizational Life 234 (1988) (emphasis added).
49. Selznick, supra note 1, at 136.
50. Id.
51. Much of the same process occurred in Great Britain save that the
question of managerial prerogative was decided by the courts under the criminal
law. Simon Deakin & Frank Wilkinson, The Law of the Labor Market:
Industrialization, Employment, and Legal Evolution 14 (2005).
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employers' moral code, or both.52 But these were resented and,
where possible, resisted by the employees made subject to them;
the scope of managerial prerogative was then, as it is now,
contested terrain.
The encroachment of work on private time today is of growing
concern; 53 it may call for economic, social, and so legal
reconstruction. But it scarcely argues for employer power over
private life. A better case can be made for the proposition that the
centuries-long human demand for "a freer individual life"
promised by capitalism's eclipse of tutelage is brought to fruition
in contemporary lawful activity legislation.
B. The Unsuitability of Judicial Intervention
The bulk of the laws assuring employees a right to engage in
lawful activity or to consume lawful products acknowledge that
countervailing considerations may allow for constraints on its
exercise. Antidiscrimination in employment law similarly
provides for legitimate business necessity (or bona fide
occupational qualification) as a defense and the courts have
recognized much the same doctrine even as applied to statutory
privacy protections. The nature of an employer, e.g., a church,54 or
of the particular employment, e.g., as corporate spokesperson,
55
52. The historical accounts are reviewed in Matthew Finkin, Employee
Privacy, American Values, and the Law, 72 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 221, 246-47,
249-51 (1996). Note, for example, the following rules issued by Carson, Pirie,
Scott, & Co., a department store, to its clerks in 1927:
5. The clerk who is in the habit of smoking Spanish Cigars-being
shaved at the barbers-going to dancing parties and other places of
amusement and being out late at night-will assuredly give his
employer reason to be ever suspicious of his integrity and honesty.
7. Each clerk must pay not less than $5.00 per year to the Church and
must attend Sunday School regularly.
8. Men clerks are given one evening a week off for courting and two
if they go to prayer meeting.
9. After the 14 hours in the store the leisure hours should be spent
mostly in reading.
Delbert Miller & William Form, Industrial Sociology 561 (1951).
53. E.g., Fighting for Time: Shifting Boundaries of Work and Social Life
(Cynthia Epstein & Anne Kallebeg eds., 2004).
54. Curay-Cramer v. Ursuline Acad., 344 F. Supp. 2d 923 (D. Del. 2004).
Cf World Briefing: Europe: Norway: Vicar Quits Universe Panel, N.Y. Times,
Jan. 14, 2006, at A7, available at 2006 WLNR 770685 (Despite his assertion
that "it was his right to do as he wished during his spare time" a Lutheran vicar
resigned as a judge for Norway's Miss Universe contest after being asked to do
so by the Bishop of Oslo.).
55. Korb v. Raytheon Corp., 574 N.E.2d 370 (Mass. 1991).
20061 957
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
may be so intertwined with aspects of off-duty conduct as to justify
an employer's constraint on it. Our authors argue, however, that as
to these lawful activity and lawful product laws, the employer's
judgment is the only one that counts; that the courts cannot be
trusted to weigh a business's interests against the statutory
protection. They do not critique the decisional law arising under
these other exemptions to bolster their case. From what appears,
they trust the courts to decide when business necessity supersedes
a claim of wrongful discrimination, but not when the claim is to
the observance of private life. They do not explain why the courts
are less to be trusted in the latter instance than in the former.
Instead they give a series of hypothetical cases, a parade of
horribles, where the employer should be free to regulate, but in
which, they fear, the courts might reach an opposite result.
The tacit assumption of the argument is that if there is a
balance to be struck, it should be for the employer to strike. I.e.,
that the employer is not only better suited than a court to know
what is in its interest, but it is better suited to strike the balance of
its employees interests as well. That argument is dealt with
elsewhere. 56 It is all of a piece with the authors' embrace of the
sanctity of the at-will rule; it exudes the Weltanschauung of the
late nineteenth century. As George Baer, spokesperson for the
anthracite coal industry, wrote in 1902, "The rights and interests of
the laboring men will be protected and cared for .. . by the
Christian men to whom God in his infinite wisdom has given
"57control of the property interests of this country ....
To our authors, whenever management conceives its business
interest potentially to be implicated there is simply no balance to
be struck. And, as we will see below, because management would
not impose a restriction unless it conceives of there being some
business connection, a law requiring proof of a connection
sufficient to persuade a public body cannot but work an
unjustifiable intrusion into managerial prerogative.
The cases we are given conveniently break down into four
situations: (1) where there is a demonstrable impact in the
workplace; (2) where the employer fears an on-the-job impact in
terms of the employee's ability adequately to perform; (3) where
the employer has a moral or ideological distaste for the employee's
56. Matthew Finkin, Privacy and the "Theory of the Firm", 26 J. Lab. Res.
711 (2005).
57. Witt Bowden, The Industrial History of the United States 890 (1930).
Clyde Summers drew the same conclusion albeit without this particular
reference. Clyde Summers, Employment At Will in the United States: The
Divine Right of Employers, 3 U. Pa. J. Lab. & Emp. L. 65 (2000).
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conduct that has otherwise no demonstrable connection to his or
her ability adequately to perform, or where the employer fears that
customer distaste on those grounds will cause it to lose business;
and (4) where the conduct manifests what management conceives
to be disloyalty to it.
Because there is as yet almost no texture of decisional law
under our lawful product and lawful activity laws, the following
will look to guidance from the law in France and Germany where
the courts have considered claims analogous to those our authors
make.58 It is interesting in that regard that employers in these
countries would seek to impose many of the controls on private life
that our authors defend despite the difference in the legal
environment: apparently the impetus for managerial control
transcends national boundaries. Thus, such comparative resort is
altogether fitting and proper: these are industrial (or post-
industrial) democracies; we share a general commitment to
economic liberalism; we share a common legal heritage, especially
in our professed respect for individual freedom; our open-
mindedness to their legal thought is a matter of record; 59 and, in a
globalized product and labor market, it makes sense to see how a
different approach to a common legal problem actually plays out.
1. Concrete Impact
The authors posit two cases. In one, the employee's activity
imposes an added cost in lost work time and medical benefits. In
the other, management has good reason to believe the worker's
physical presence on the job is so offensive as to cost it co-workers
and customers. As will be shown straightaway, neither of these
cases is problematic, one way or the other.
58. France's highest court for such matters is the Cour de Cassation and it
will be referred to as such. The German labor court system is composed of a
court of first instance, the Arbeitsgericht (ArbG), an intermediate court of
appeal, the Landesarbeitsgericht (LAG), and a federal and final court of appeal,
the Bundesarbeitsgericht (BAG). These decisions will be referred to by the
courts' respective acronyms.
59. Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 387, 18 S. Ct. 383, 389 (1898) (quoting
Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516,531,4 S. Ct. 111, 118 (1884)):
There is nothing in Magna Charta, rightly construed as a broad charter
of public right and law, which ought to exclude the best ideas of all
systems and of every age; and, as it was the characteristic principle of
the common law to draw its inspiration from every fountain of justice,
we are not to assume that the sources of its supply have been
exhausted.
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a. The Snow Mobiling Customer Service Representative
A customer service representative whose hobby of
snowmobiling causes her to be injured many days each
winter, thereby creating attendance problems and requiring
the employer to pay for her medical expenses under its
group health plan[.]
Our customer service representative seems to be accident-
prone (and oddly impervious to it), for in 2001, fewer than thirteen
thousand of over four and a half million of those who
snowmobiled (i.e., 0.0028 of them) were injured.6° In contrast,
thirty-nine percent of non-work related disability injuries,
3,600,000 in all, were the result of automobile accidents; and
another twenty-nine percent, 2,900,000 of them, were the result of
accidents in the home.61 Curiously, our cost-conscious employer
hasn't ordered employees who'd been in auto accidents not to
drive, nor does it inspect its employees' homes to see if adequate
precautions against accidents have been taken.62 Yet our authors
depict an employer overwhelmed by the cost of one hapless
employee's recreational accidents. In fact, they point out that
federal law prohibits the employer, as a self-insurer or self-funder
of medical benefits, from excluding injuries from certain sporting
activities from coverage, including snowmobiling.63  Obviously,
60. National Safety Council, Injury Facts 130 (2004 ed.).
61. Id. at 52.
62. Henry Ford conditioned his $5 a day wage on employees being made
subject to intense home inspection for wholesomeness and adherence to middle
class values. Stuart Brandes, American Welfare Capitalism 1880-1940, 88-89
(1970). Our authors would seem to have no difficulty with an employer
requiring its employees to submit to home inspections for accident reduction
purposes.
63. As the authors point out, the Federal Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) is applicable to employers insofar as they
are either self-insurers for their employees' medical benefit or fund a group
health plan via a third party. They note that it forbids a group health plan or
insurer to exclude from coverage or to require a greater employee premium for
employees based inter alia on "evidence of insurability." "Evidence of
insurability" is defined by regulation to include participation in activities such as
snowboarding, horseback riding, skiing, and the like. 29 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(1)(G)
(2004), as interpreted in 29 C.F.R. § 2590.702(a)(2)(ii) (2004). See H.R. Rep.
No. 104-496, pt. 1, at 76, 5 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1865, 1876 (1996):
The Committee notes that the inclusion of evidence of insurability in
the definition of "health status" is intended to ensure, among other
things, the individuals are not excluded from health care coverage due
to their participation in activities such as motorcycling, snowmobiling,
all-terrain vehicle riding, horseback riding, skiing and other similar
activities.
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Congress sought to protect the right of employees covered by these
health plans to engage in those activities. If these recreational
activities result in greater medical costs, federal law expects
business to bear it; but our authors fail to see this provision as
stating a public policy that in any way colors the employer's
obligations.64 To the contrary, because these costs cannot be
avoided, the authors would have the employer forbid the activity
potentially giving rise to them.
In the event, the answer to this question is straightforward:
Under a lawful activity law an employer may not forbid an
employee to engage in recreational sport out of concern that the
activity might or does result in some cost to the employer.65 What
else would such a law mean? Why else would it be needed?
b. The Odiferous Waiter
A waiter at a vegetarian restaurant smokes while off-duty
and off-premises, but shows up for work with the smell of
tobacco on his clothes and hair[.]
The answer here is equally categorical, though to an opposite
effect. It is irrelevant that the employee is a waiter and that he
works in a vegetarian restaurant. A saleswoman wearing a
noisome perfume or sporting a tongue-post would do as well
64. Nothing in the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA),
which HIPAA amends, would forbid an employer from refusing to hire an
employee who snowmobiles. But Section 510 of the Act prohibits
discrimination in regard to incumbent employees "for the purpose of interfering
with the attainment of any right to which such [benefit plan] participant may
become entitled under the plan." 29 U.S.C. § 1140. Insofar as discharge would
be grounded exclusively on the employer's desire to reduce the medical costs
attendant to such activity-activity that Congress meant to be covered-it would
seem to violate the Act's prohibition to dismiss an employee to defeat the
attainment of those medical benefits.
65. Under German law an employee has a right to continued pay for a set
period of disability if the disability is without the employee's fault. This is
provided for in the German Civil Code, Biirgerliches Gesetzbuch [BGB] [Civil
Code] 16, and in the Act on the Continuation of Payment in the Case of Sickness
and Public Holidays-the Entgeldfortzahlungsgesetz (EFZG). The labor courts
have considered the right of employees to engage in off-duty activities, when
injury is incurred as a result, in deciding the question of fault. They have
required continued wage payment to employees injured in amateur boxing,
hang-gliding, playing soccer, and even when folkdancing (Schuhplattler) on a
table. 2 Daubler, supra note 20, at 490. But they have required the employee to
bear that cost when he or she engages in especially dangerous sports such as




insofar as the employer's concern is for on-the-job conduct that
repels customers. Nor is consuming a lawful product the nub of
the employer's concern, for an employee with close customer (or
co-worker) contact who refuses to use a lawful product, i.e., a
deodorant, would be equally situated. The employer interest here
is with on-the-job behavior that the employer is free to control.
c. The Cost Conundrum
As a cost to the business impends in both these cases-in the
former, in the form of lost work time and elevated medical
benefits, in the latter, in the form of lost customers-it can be
argued that there is no principled economic basis on which to
distinguish them; because the employer can regulate the waiter's
odiferousness it ought also be able to regulate the customer service
representative's snowmobiling. The premise is correct, these cases
cannot be distinguished in economic terms; but the conclusion
does not follow for the distinction is societal, not economic.
Employers are forbidden to make a variety of decisions that are
arguably cost-effective because we deem them socially
unacceptable: In the vast majority of states, truck laws going back
a century forbid contracts permitting employers to withhold wages,
commonly a month or six weeks of pay, as a bond to secure good
performance and timely notice of quitting, even though these
provisions may well reduce the costs of lost work time,
recruitment, and job training.66 Nor may an employer refuse to
hire a union organizer even though her organizational efforts, if
successful, will inevitably result in demands for higher wages and
benefits.67 The critical distinction between the snowmobiling
customer service representative and the odiferous waiter is social,
not economic: the latter involves behavior on the job, the former
behavior away from it. If, as a matter of policy, we think it wrong
for an employer to conflate the two, the role of cost must be treated
less deferentially in the former situation than in the latter,68 and
even in the latter, as we have just seen, certain cost-effective
66. Paterson, supra note 24.
67. NLRB v. Town & Country Elec. Co., 516 U.S. 85, 116 S. Ct. 450
(1995). As Robert Gorman observed, "[w]hat is anti-union animus, if not a
resistance to the union because of the economic burdens it will impose?"
Archibald Cox et al., Labor Law 241 (13th ed. 2001).
68. Because employers may exclude smoking-related conditions from
coverage under their group medical plans, shifting the risk of those costs onto
employees, there would seem to be scant justification for a prohibition on hiring
smokers in those states lacking a lawful product law. See Christianson v. Poly-
Am., Inc., Med. Benefit Plan, 412 F.3d 935 (8th Cir. 2005).
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measures may be socially, and so be legally, unacceptable. The
question of what makes for a good society is not definitively
answered by pointing to an employer's balance sheet.
2. Fear of an Effect on Workplace Performance
The authors give us seven cases:
" An attorney at a law firm drinks heavily and shows
up for work in the morning hung over, but otherwise
able to work;
" A chief financial officer of a publicly traded
company is frequently seen wagering large sums of
(her own) money at local casinos and racetracks;
" A bookkeeper/accountant begins to rack up huge
credit card debt because of his hobby of collecting
rare stamps and coins;
" A supervisor with a gay subordinate takes an active
off-work role in an anti-gay group that is lobbying
for strict sodomy laws and that openly advocates that
gay and lesbians should be "cured" of their
"disease";
" A supervisor and a subordinate in a different
department have a consensual affair that they openly
flaunt to friends and colleagues off-duty;
" A sales/marketing manager at a health spa begins
eating an unhealthy diet and grows heavy and out of
shape; [and]
" A prominent scientist at a university develops an
interest in becoming a psychic and does palm
readings for students on the side[.]
Note that in none of these cases has there been any effect onjob performance. Indeed, our authors claim that employers should
be able to act in these cases without having to await any workplace
effect. But if we wish to insulate private life from employer
control, absent an effect on job performance or workplace
efficiency, would we not want to require such a demonstrable
effect as a condition of exemption? Let us work through the
authors' object lessons with that in mind.
The imbibing lawyer. Should it make a difference that our
lawyer is bleary-eyed from drink in contradistinction to being
bleary-eyed from attending religious revivals or participating in
late night amateur theatricals? Nothing would prohibit the
employer from expressing concern to the employee about the
possibility of any of these activities affecting her workplace
2006] 963
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performance. Absent an effect on performance, however, the
employee could no more be discharged for enjoying alcohol 69 than
she could for attending revival meetings, participating in
theatricals, or persistently staying up late with a chronically ill
child-lawful activities all.
The gambling CFO & the coin collecting bookkeeper. Personal
probity is surely an essential requirement in both jobs, but is
gambling or incurring debts a litmus test of one's probity? If
gambling (where lawful) were morally disqualifying, neither the
Author of the Declaration of Independence,7M nor the author of the
Book of Virtues7 1 would be eligible for a position of trust. If
running up a huge debt disqualifies our bookkeeper, apparently for
fear of defalcation, should it not be irrespective of how the debt
was incurred? Standing as surety for an improvident parent or
accumulating enormous medical bills for a child's catastrophic
illness would do as well, would they not, lawful activities each?
72
The homophobic supervisor. Some of the most publicly
prominent and vocal opponents of the "gay rights" movement
ground their criticism in the teachings of their church. One who
publicly expresses these opinions as a genuine aspect of
authentically-held religious belief can be discharged when that
expression takes place in the workplace and so creates a harassing
working condition for subordinates and co-workers. 73 But that is
not this case; there is no suggestion here of workplace expression
or effect.
69. The LAG in Munich made it plain thirty years ago that the enjoyment of
alcohol having no impact on on-the-job performance could not be prohibited
and, per contra, where the effect of drinking over the weekend (by a truck
driver) rendered the employee incapable of performance on the following
Monday, discharge would be permissible. Judgment of 23 Sept. 1975 LAG
Munich, reported in Betriebs-Berater 1976, 465.
70. Jefferson's notebook for June 10-July 2, 1776, i.e., whilst drafting the
Declaration of Independence, included the sums won and lost in
"backgammon," "cross and pyle," "lotto," and "cards." H. Chafetz, Play the
Devil: A History of Gambling in the United States from 1492-1955, 31 (1960).
71. See Joshua Green, The Bookie of Virtue: William J. Bennett Has Made
Millions Lecturing People on Morality-And Blown It on Gambling, Wash.
Monthly (June 2003), available at http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/features/
003/0306.green.html.
72. Alternatively, the employer might fear the expense and threat to
efficiency should the employees' wages be subject to garnishment due to these
debts; and it might fear as well the bad publicity were the employee compelled
to file for bankruptcy. But both federal (and most state) laws protect employees
from discharge due to garnishment, 15 U.S.C. § 1674(a), and federal law does so
with respect to bankruptcy as well. 11 U.S.C. § 525(b).
73. Bodett v. Coxcom, Inc., 366 F.3d 736 (9th Cir. 2004).
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Should an employee not have a right to engage in political
speech outside the workplace? The Payne dissenters thought they
should and so do several state statutes that specifically protect
extramural political speech or activity.
Insofar as Title VII protects non-workplace religious speech,
speech which might be directed to the public political sphere out of
religious conviction, why should it make a difference that the
speech at issue here stems from the speaker's non-religiously
grounded conception of the good society? Given the growing
ethnic and religious diversity of the workforce, it might be
expected that the workplace will increasingly be inhabited by
persons of sharply differing views on the most highly charged
political issues of the day, those that fire the strongest passions-
abortion, the Iraq War, gay marriage, gun control, the Middle East.
Should employers be allowed to tell employees, however quiescent
they may be at work, that they may not be outspoken publicly on
these or like issues on their own time? (In the large number of
states that protect the employee's right to vote free of employer
control, the law would be accordingly that an employee may vote
for a candidate running on a platform of "family values," but may
not publicly urge others to do so.) Would not the exercise of such
corporate power tend to "sap the foundation of our free
institutions, ' '74 just as Payne dissenters feared more than a century
ago? Our authors are indifferent to the negative externalities of the
exercise of the power they would accord. Indeed, they deny the
very existence of any public interest in it. We will have occasion
to revisit that issue a bit further on.
The lovebirds. Our employee-lovers are not in a supervisor-
subordinate relationship on the job; indeed, they are in separate
departments. There is no apparent conflict of interest nor any
prospect of favoritism. Accordingly, the principle that should
guide the judiciary under a lawful activity law was stated by Judge
McLaughlin:
It is repugnant to our most basic ideals in a free society
that an employer can destroy an individual's livelihood on
the basis of whom he is courting, without first having to
establish that the employee's relationshio is adversely
affecting the employer's business interests.
74. Payne v. W. & At. R.R. Co., 81 Tenn. 507, 16 (1884) (Freeman, J.,
dissenting).
75. McCavitt v. Swiss Reinsurance Am. Corp., 237 F.3d 166, 169, 170 (2d
Cir. 2001) (McLaughlin, C.J., concurring) (citing with approval N.Y. v. Wal-
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Our authors have added another factor, however: that the co-
workers are "flaunting" their relationship. Nothing more is said
about this. We are left to speculate that this affronts their
colleagues' sense of moral decorum, but co-worker moral
preferences are surely entitled to no greater solicitude than the
employer's.
The obese sales manager. This is an interesting case, but not
really one of lifestyle regulation, for obesity need not be the
result of eating habits.76 In fact, it makes no difference to the
employer why its sales manager has become obese. The spa's
management believes its salesmen should be physical models for
the service they sell and that an obese salesman is a bad model,
however capable otherwise. Thus, the question actually
presented is whether obesity ought be a category subject to legal
protection: Michigan forbids discrimination on grounds of
weight." The District of Columbia forbids discrimination on
grounds of "personal appearance," meaning "bodily condition or
characteristics;,, 78 and its allowance of "business necessity" as a
defense would seem to reject the employer's "role model"
theory.79 The French Labor Code forbids discrimination on the
grounds of "physical appearance." 80  Should this principle be
adopted more widely? The authors think not, and let us concede
arguendo that they may be right.8 ' But can it be said with
positive assurance that that decision is not a matter of social
policy in which the public interest may call on the legislature to
decide?
The palmist professor. This is a curious example for the
professoriate has long maintained the separation of private life
from professional life as a matter of principle, and that principle
is generally accepted as a matter of institutional policy
Mart Stores, 621 N.Y.S.2d 158, 160 (App. Div. 1995) (Yesawich, J.,
dissenting)).
76. Where obesity is the result of a medical condition it is treated as a
matter of disability discrimination. Finkin, Privacy in Employment Law, supra
note 5, at 415-17.
77. Mich. Comp. Laws § 37.2102 (2001).
78. D.C. Code Ann. § 2-1401.02(22) (2001).
79. Id. at § 2-1401.03(a) (disallowing "the preferences of co-workers,
employers, customers or any other person" to constitute a defense).
80. Labor Code art. 122-45 (Law No. 2001-1066, 16 Nov. 2001) [de son
apparence physique]. The French law is discussed by Martine Le Friant,
Rechtstechniken im Kampf gegen die Diskriminierungen: Die Lage in
Frankreich, AuR 2003, 51.
81. See generally Robert Post, Prejudicial Appearances: The Logic of
American Antidiscrimination Law (2001).
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throughout non-denominational American higher education.82
The academic profession recognizes, as an ethical principle, that
a professor has a relationship of confidence with his or her
students: evaluations of student work should reflect the student's
true merit; the professor should avoid any exploitation,
harassment, or discriminatory treatment of students.83  Absent
evidence that the professor is grading students according to his or
her palm readings or is exploiting, harassing, or discriminating
against students as a result of those readings, it is beyond
peradventure in the academic community that the institution
would not be authorized to order him to desist; the mere
opportunity for an ethical lapse cannot provide a basis for
regulating private life any more than it would justify intrusive
monitoring in professional life.
Has this precept broader purchase? French law thinks it has.
Madame Mazurais was a medical secretary in Cannes, with
access to confidential patient files. She became a reader of tarot
("voyante tarologue") and was dismissed out of concern that she
might breach patient confidentiality, perhaps even to predict the
patients' medical futures on the basis of her readings. The Cour
de Cassation held the termination impermissible for want of
evidence of an actual breach of confidentiality, i.e., for the want
of any evidence that her private activity affected her job
performance. 4
82. The literature here is substantial starting with Richard Hofstadter &
Walter Metzger, The Development of Academic Freedom in the United States
(1955). See American Association of University Professors, Recommended
Institutional Regulations on Academic Freedom and Tenure § 5(a), in AAUP
Policy Documents and Reports 21, 25 (9th Ed. 2001) ("Adequate cause for a
dismissal will be related, directly and substantially, to the fitness of faculty
members in their professional capacities as teachers or researchers. Dismissal
will not be used to restrain faculty members in their exercise of academic
freedom or other rights of American citizens."). The insulation of private life
from institutional scrutiny has been extended to Church-affiliated institutions.
Academic Freedom and Tenure: Lynchburg College, 64 Academe 498 (1979).
An excess of professional caution counsels the author to disclose that he has
served as General Counsel to the American Association of University Professors
and as chairman of its Committee A on Academic Freedom and Tenure.
83. American Association of University Professors, Statement on
Professional Ethics, in AAUP Policy Documents and Reports 21, 25 (9th Ed.
2001).




3. Employer or Customer Repugnance on Political or Moral
Grounds
a. Political Activity
We earlier took up the case of the homophobic supervisor
actively lobbying for anti-gay laws. The employer feared his
political speech would create a hostile environment vis-a-vis co-
workers, even though no hostility to subordinates or co-workers
was manifested in the workplace. To it we now should add the two
further hypotheticals our authors supply:
" A hotel manager joins the Ku Klux Klan, eventually
assumes the position of Grand Dragon, and is
involved in organizing a public parade (with all
appropriate permits) to advocate the repeal of the
civil rights laws and a return to segregation;
" A nursing home attendant accepts an off-duty role as
a prominent spokesperson for a euthanasia group[.]
What the Grand Dragon and euthanasia advocate add is the
prospect of the employer's loss of business resulting respectively
from the repugnance putative hotel guests might have with the
manager's views and with nursing patient family members'
potential fear that the advocate might turn activist on the job.
These cases vex because we accept the fact that customer
preference has full sway when a service is performed by an
independent contractor. A doctor who publicly defends the right to
abortion and a lawyer who publicly defends the civil liberties of an
accused terrorist risk losing patients and clients respectively out of
disapproval with their expressions or activities. But, they may well
replenish their practices with patients and clients sympathetic to
them. Employees are differently situated: so long as an employer
believes that any segment of the public it would like to serve, no
matter how small, may turn away in consequence of an employee's
outspokenness on a social or political question, it would have
reason to chill her expression. The playing field here is inherently
biased.
German law, which recognizes employee freedom of
expression (Meinungsfreiheit), also recognizes that, on occasion,
there can be very real difficulties in defining its boundaries.8 5 The
truly vexing cases treat political expression in the workplace, not
85. Ginther Schaub, Arbeitsrechts-Handbuch § 53 II 5, 378 n.26 (8th ed.
1996) (collecting the rich literature); 2 Daubler, supra note 20, § 5.8, at 242-
350.
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away from it, though employers have been allowed to proscribe
prominent public participation in certain kinds of organizations,
e.g., of neo-Nazi or totalitarian persuasion.86 Apart from the latter,
historically freighted situations, to be subject of employer control,
speech must be shown to have a concrete impact in the workplace:
as the Landesarbeitsgericht (LAG) in Baden-Wuirttenberg recently
put it, "In the employment relationship, the saying 'he who pays
the piper calls the tune' is contrary to the constitutional conception
of a person [das Menschenbild des Grundgesetzes]."87
We need not decide here whether customer preference, which
is not a defense to other forms of discrimination, should be a
defense to political discrimination-how manifest it must be, how
real and great the threat of disruption or loss must be, and the
88like. It is enough to show that that is a question in which the
public interest is deeply implicated and which the courts would be
quite properly called upon to decide.
b. Moral Objection
" A public relations consultant for a civic organization
has a public affair with a married person, and the
affair is widely reported in the media;
" A nursery school teacher takes an evening job as an
exotic dancer at a local topless club named the
Candi Store[.]
It does not appear that the civic organization's raison d'etre is
the advocacy of marital fidelity; nor are our toddlers likely to be
habitu6s of the Candi Store. The off duty activity in the first case
is not in conflict with the employer's mission nor, in the second
case, is it likely to scandalize the clientele. On what other basis
would the employer be privileged to act? The German labor courts
have confronted both situations and their conclusions have been
equally categorical. The LAG in Diisseldorf held almost forty
years ago that an employee's carrying on an extramarital affair is
none of the employer's business: "The defendant fails to
appreciate his place as an employer. As such, he is not called upon
86. 2 Diubler, supra note 20, § 5.2-5.2 at 349-50.
87. Judgment of 29 July 2004, LAG Baden-Wurttenberg, reported in AuR
2005, 343. ("Die auf das Arbeitsverhaltnis bezogene Redewendung 'wes Brot
ich eB, des Lied ich sing' widerspricht dem Menschenbild des Grundgesetzes.")
["Whose bread I eat is whose song I sing"]. On the law's "conception of a
person," its Menschenbild, see Matthew Finkin, Menschenbild: The Conception
of the Employee as a Person in Western Law, supra note 15.
88. Cf. Melzer v. Bd. of Educ., 336 F.3d 185 (2d Cir. 2003).
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to judge the morals of his employees . . . [The employer can
exercise no influence over the private affairs of employees." An
elementary school teacher's part-time job at a "swingers' club"
was held more recently by the LAG in Hamm to fail to supply a
basis for discharge: 90 the club was seventy kilometers from the
school and the teacher's activities there were not known to the
parents or colleagues. At a minimum, absent proof of actual loss
to the civic organization or disruption of the school, one is hard
pressed to conclude other than in favor of individual freedom, just
as these courts did.
4. Disloyalty
The lawful activity and lawful product laws' exemptions for
job relatedness recognize that certain confessional or advocacy
organizations can place limits where a profit-making enterprise
could not. But our authors argue that these exemptions beg the
basic question:
If the Coca-Cola company wants its employees to drink
Coke and not Pepsi, and terminates an employee for
violating this rule, shouldn't Coke be entitled to discourage
the use of a competitor's (lawful) product by its own
employees? 9
The answer given by a labor arbitrator almost a half century
ago is-no, not as a matter of positive law, but as a matter of
industrial justice.92  A service mechanic for a Ford distributor
purchased a Nash Rambler (he liked the Ford Falcon but his wife
89. Judgment of Feb. 24, 1969, LAG Diisseldorf, reported in DB 1969, at
667 ("Der Beklagte verkennt insoweit seine Stellung als Arbeitgeber. Als
solcher ist er nicht zum Sittenrichter fiber die in seinem Betrieb ttigen
Angestellten und Arbeiter berufen .... Auf die privaten Angelegenheiten der
Arbeitnehmer vermag er keinen EinfluB auzujiben."). The Federal Labor Court
a decade ago held homosexuality an impermissible ground of action:
The establishment of the area of private life remains outside the
employer's sphere of influence and is limited by the duties of the
employment contract only insofar as the private behavior affects the
workplace and leads to its disruption.
Judgment of June 6, 1994, BAG, reported in SAE 1995, at 103, 106 ("Die
Gestaltung des privaten Lebensbereiches steht auBerhalb der Einfluflsphare des
Arbeitgebers und wird durch arbeitsvertragliche Pflichten nur insoweit
eingeschriinkt, als sich das private Verhalten auf den betreiblichen Bereich
auswirkt und dort zu Storungen flhrt .... ).
90. Judgment of Jan. 19, 2001, LAG Hamm, reprinted in AuR 2002, 433.
91. Howie & Shapero, supra note 21, at 24.
92. Paul Swanson, 36 LA 305 (Gochnauer, Arb. 1961).
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rather fancied the Rambler) and he was discharged for it: the
purchase, the employer argued, implicitly disparaged its product
and demonstrated disloyalty to the organization that paid his wage.
In reply, the Arbitrator observed that, "An employee is, not
required to spend money where he earns it."'93 A salesman, one
who represents the product to the public, might be required
publicly to manifest approval of the product he sells, but
mechanics in the service department? Their "personal beliefs
about the product they work on is their own affair. '
94
Our mechanic's freedom of choice was protected by a
collective agreement that required "just cause" to discharge; but
workers elsewhere are protected by a principle of positive law. In
1989, Mme. Rossard was a secretary for a Renault distributor in
Montmorillon. She replaced her Renault with a Peugeot 405, a car
of like size and cost, and was fired.95 Her employer viewed her
conduct exactly as did the Ford agency in California a generation
before: her purchase created a suspicion about the quality of its
merchandise, it implied public criticism of the product, it showed a
lack of appreciation for the interests of her employer, and was an
act of disloyalty. The Cour de Cassation would have none of it:
"[I]n her private life the employee is free to buy the goods,
products, or merchandise of her choice." 96
IV. THE RETURN TO TUTELAGE
To our authors, managers must be able to control employees in
their non-work life whenever they see any business justification so
long as the activity they direct is not, strictly speaking, criminal.
Contrary to the logic of free labor captured in the Payne dissent
and given legal expression in these lawful activity and lawful
product laws, their ideology returns us to the relationship of master
and servant. Our authors would countenance the following
hypothetical (but, as will be shown, not entirely fanciful) directive
from the management of a multi-national soft drink company to its
American workforce.
93. Id. at 308.
94. Id.
95. Cour de cassation, Chambre sociale, [Cass. soc.], No. 90-42517, Jan. 22,
1991.
96. Id. ("dans sa vie privde, la salarid est libre d'acheter les biens, produits
ou merchandise du son choix.").
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Dear valued members of our corporate family:
1. As a service to our employees, the Company has
made available a debt counselor to help those in
financial distress. This is good for our employees
and good for the Company because we believe that
employees who incur large debts are less efficient
than those who are financially secure: they are
more likely to be distracted at work or less
committed, feeling that they're working for a
financial institution and not for their own
betterment. However, we believe that some
employees are incurring unnecessarily high levels
of debt and are not taking full advantage of our
counseling service. Consequently, we have found
an even better way to help you. As you know, we
have arranged for your banking to be done
electronically via our computer system and even
have a "reasonable use" policy permitting the use of
our computer system for personal business. We
think it an improvement of our service to you that
not only personal banking but all other business
transactions, e.g., stock trades, electronic
purchasing, and the like, be conducted through our
system alone.[ 97] Pursuant to our Employee Privacy
Policy, only our Human Resource Management
Department will have access to these records and
only for the purpose of assuring that employees who
incur unusually high debts are properly counseled.
A persistent carrying of large debts will be
considered in detennining the employee's suitability
for continued employment. A form agreeing to
these terms will shortly be circulated for your
signature. Failure to accept will result discharge.
2. Some employees have told us via our hotline
"suggestion box" that they believe our non-
fraternization policy, forbidding any employee of
97. Cf Rule Change by Fidelity, N.Y. Times, July 13, 1994, at D2,
available at 1994 WLNR 3560883. Fidelity Investments was requiring its
13,700 employees to conduct their personal brokerage trades with the firm rather
than with brokers of their choice, to "enable Fidelity to track the personal
trading patterns of its employees more easily." The rationale for this rule differs
significantly from the above.
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the company to date or to become romantically
involved with any other employee, is unfair. They
have pointed out that the potential conflicts the
policy is intended to prevent from spilling over into
the workplace could apply to relationships with
employees of our customers and to contractors as
well. We agree. Accordingly, employees of these
businesses and contractors will be included in our
non-fraternization policy. [98]
3. As you may know, a number of universities have
told us they will cancel their "pour" contracts giving
us exclusive rights to sell our products on campus
locations, because, unfortunately, they have been
badly misled into believing that one affiliate in a
single South American location has not treated its
employees fairly. [99] These contracts are very
important to the Company-and to you. Our Public
Relations Department has drawn up spontaneous
letters from concerned alumni to institutions
considering this action, to urge their Alma Maters
not to do so, and threatening to withhold donations
if they do. Department heads will soon have a list
of the schools our employees have graduated from
and will be circulating these letters for you to
sign.[' °° ] Time is of the essence. You must sign
your spontaneous letter immediately.
4. As you may have read in the news, our recent
acquisition of Stygian Springs® Sparkling Water
has generated a lot of bad publicity from self-
appointed so-called "public interest" groups. Our
Public Relations Department has explained over and
over again that the bacterial tests, conducted by an
incompetent laboratory, preceded our acquisition.
98. Cf Guardsmark, LLC and Serv. Employees Int'l Union, Local 24/, 344
N.L.R.B. No. 97 (2005) (rule forbidding employees from dating or becoming
"overly friendly with client's employees" does not violate the Labor Act).
99. This draws from http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2006/01/
03/coke and http://killercoke.org/news.htm.
100. An employer may require its employees to be "billboards" for the
company's views, absent a restriction found in positive law. Drake v. Cheyenne
Newspapers, Inc., 891 P.2d 80 (Wyo. 1995). Nor do most states prohibit an
employer's control of employee donations to non-religious and non-labor
organizations. Ball v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 602 A.2d 1176 (Md. 1992).
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Nevertheless, sales have been disappointing. We
think it imperative that our employees manifest
public support for our product.[10 r] Whenever you
purchase water, in a restaurant or a supermarket,
make sure that it is Stygian Springs.® This is as
much a company obligation as showing up on time.
Such a ukase would be unlawful for our bottler to issue to its
employees in France, Germany, and the many other jurisdictions,
in Europe and elsewhere, that cabin the exercise of managerial
control to what is understood to be an employer's legitimate
sphere. There is no evidence that companies in these jurisdictions
are less productive or profitable because they are required to
respect their employees' right to a life away from work. Should
the company's American employees not have the same freedom
enjoyed by their co-workers abroad? And, if not, why?
101. In Roberts v. Adkins, 444 S.E.2d 725, 729 (W. Va. 1994), the court held
public policy, found in a "company store" prohibition, to have been violated by
the discharge of an employee of an oil company for purchasing a car from a
competitor of another business owned by his employer. However, the court
opined that it would be a different situation were the purchase to have been that
of a product of a competitor of the employee's proximate employer, not simply
of a competitor of an unrelated business owned by the employer. Id. at n.7.
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